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1. Introduction
Unemployment in Hungary and Poland has risen dramatically since late 1989 when 
the process of privatization and economic reform began to accelerate. To ease the hardship 
associated with worker dislocation and to maintain social stability, the governments of these 
countries acted quickly to institute unemployment compensation and a variety of active labor 
programs. The active labor programs adopted include nearly the full menu existing in 
nations with developed market economies: retraining, public service employment, wage 
subsidies, self-employment assistance, job creation investments, work sharing, early 
retirement subsidies, and the employment exchange.
This paper compares employment policies in Hungary and Poland and overviews the 
systems being implemented for monitoring the performance of these programs. The 
management systems being introduced for labor market programs in Hungary and Poland are 
examples of performance driven government. They are idealized versions of systems like 
those called for by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 passed by the 
103rd United States Congress. 1 In both Hungary and Poland, performance indicators have 
been specified to measure the success of each labor market program. This information will 
provide an important basis for program management and planning. A performance 
measurement system has been functioning in Hungary since the begining of 1994. 
Nationwide training in methods for performance management will be conducted in Poland in 
November 1995.
The performance indicators systems were designed to promote decentralized decision 
making while still allowing monitoring of program effectiveness by federal employment 
program managers. The systems being implemented allow a standardized assessment of 
program performance both across administrative districts and across programs. Measures of 
performance were carefully selected so as to minimize adverse incentives. The systems are 
intended to promote superior performance through positive incentives, and to help identify 
and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or sanctions.
An important distinction of the employment policy experience in these countries is 
that the collection of labor market support programs was largely adopted as a unified set 
rather than in the gradual piece-meal fashion experienced in the economically developed 
nations. Furthermore, since Hungary and Poland each operate all labor market programs 
through a single agency, the process of client intake and referral to programs is conducted in 
a relatively coordinated fashion. The unified nature of active labor programs is further 
advanced by the information and management systems developed.
*The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 is formally Public Law 103-62, 
approved August 3, 1993.
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To this point in time the transfer of knowledge about employment policy has been 
from the mature market economies to the less developed countries. Even the management 
systems developed for active labor programs in Hungary and Poland are adapted from 
monitoring methods used in nations with developed market economies, but because programs 
in Hungary and Poland are operated in a coordinated way the performance indicators systems 
provide a simultaneous view of the effectiveness of all programs thereby clearly revealing 
policy trade-offs. These management systems are models for other nations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and they may also provide insights for nations with much longer histories of 
public employment policy.
In the next section the evolution of labor market conditions in Hungary and Poland 
during the transition to market economics is described. Section 3 then provides an overview 
of the important features of active labor programs recently implemented to support 
development of competitive labor markets. Section 4 summarizes performance measurement 
systems introduced in both countries to support decentralized decision making in employment 
policy and promote superior performance through positive incentives. The specific 
performance indicators used are also listed in Section 4 together with general descriptions of 
how these indicators were selected. Section 5 shows how performance indicators depend on 
administrative and follow-up data, and describes the computerized management information 
systems under development; plans for using the results of performance measurement to 
improve program management and planning are also given. Section 6 provides a description 
of how demographic data on clients and indicators of conditions in local labor markets may 
be used to adjust national standards for local conditions and reduce creaming in program 
assignment. The final section provides a summary of how information from the performance 
assessment may be used in the annual planning and budget allocation process for employment 
programs.
2. Labor Market Conditions in Hungary and Poland
In a population of about 10 million with a labor force nearly half that size, registered 
unemployment in Hungary rose from 23,000 in January, 1990 to 705,000 in February, 1993. 
Kollo (1993) estimates that during this period a million jobs were lost in Hungary, with part 
of the loss (188,000) absorbed by the retirement of workers, while the working age 
population grew by over 100,000. He admits some job growth during the period, but also 
estimates that nearly a quarter-million dropped out of the labor force. Trends during the 
years 1989-93 in the Hungarian labor market and economy are summarized in Table 1. 
Since 1993 measured unemployment in Hungary has declined somewhat and as of March 
1995 stood at an 11.5 percent national average. LdzaY and Sz£kely (1994) provide evidence 
from a survey of unemployment compensation exhaustees that the decline in unemployment is 
not associated with excessive increases in inactivity. Unemployment trends in various 
regions of Hungary are summarized in Table 2. Unemployment has been highest in the 
northeastern mining and metallurgy regions and the agricultural plains of the east which have 
lost the important Soviet and Comecon markets.
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the national and regional trends in unemployment in Poland 
as well as some other aspects of national economic activity. Officially measured 
unemployment in Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to 16.0 percent in 1993 measured on the 
basis of registrations with the employment exchange. Gora (1994) asserts that the process of 
rising unemployment in Poland over the 1990-93 period was accompanied by "low outflow 
rates that were very low by international standards...At the same time inflow rates were quite 
moderate." In particular, Gora has noted that unemployment estimates based on registered 
unemployment may be overstated because many persons who are truly inactive only maintain 
registration with the placement service so as to keep eligibility for national health insurance.
3. Active Labor Programs (ALPs)
Both Hungary and Poland operate unemployment compensation programs. 
Micklewright and Nagy (1994) provide an excellent analysis of the working of the Hungarian 
system, and O'Leary and Targowski (1993, p. 12-3) provide an explicit statement of rules 
for the Polish system. Unemployment compensation is a passive labor market support 
measure. The focus of this paper is active labor programs (ALPs).
Table 5 provides a list comparing ALPs operated in Hungary and Poland. Both 
countries operate an employment exchange or placement service, plus retraining, self 
employment, and job creation investment programs. Wage subsidies are operated in each, 
however, in Hungary the long term unemployed are the target group, while in Poland recent 
graduates are the beneficiaries of wage subsidies. Hungary and Poland each operate public 
service employment programs; Poland also operates Intervention Works programs which are 
shorter in duration and operated by private employers. Hungary also operates work sharing 
and early retirement, two programs not available in Poland. Poland is currently considering 
instituting a work sharing scheme.
The programs listed in Table 5 are as operated in 1995. Dramatic change is 
imminent in Hungary where it is likely that the menu of ALPs will be trimmed to four in 
1996: retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term unemployed, and 
self-employment assistance. This paper presents the performance measurement systems 
developed to support management of the employment programs listed in Table 5. In the 
following two subsections a bit more detail about the operation of ALPs in the two countries 
is given. 2
2In each country the employment exchange operates as a central intake and referral 
agency for referral to job listings or ALPs. Detail on the employment exchange or 
placement service are not listed separately for each country.
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3.1 ALPs in Hungary
Retraining - Article 14 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides for the possibility of 
training for persons who are either unemployed, expected to become unemployed, or 
currently involved in public service employment (PSE). Certain provisions are also made for 
recent school leavers who are unemployed. The support for training may include a 
supplement to earnings or a benefit in lieu of earnings, and reimbursement of direct training 
expenses. The amount of benefit in lieu of earnings is equal to 110 percent of the 
unemployment compensation otherwise payable.
Self Employment Assistance - Article 15 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides for self 
employment assistance for persons who are eligible for unemployment compensation. The 
support may amount to 6 monthly payments of unemployment compensation beyond the basic 
one year eligibility. Support may also include reimbursement of up to 50 percent of the cost 
of professional entrepreneurial counseling services, and 50 percent of the cost of any training 
courses required for engaging in the entrepreneurial activity. A little used provision allows 
for payment of up to 50 percent of one year's premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed 
to start the enterprise. 3
Wage Subsidy for Hiring Long Term Unemployed - Article 16 of the Employment Act of 
1991 provides for up to a 50 percent wage subsidy for up to one year of total labor costs for 
hiring persons unemployed for more than 6 months (3 months for school leavers), provided 
the employer has not laid off anyone involved in the same line of work in the previous 6 
months and does not lay off anyone during the subsequent 3 months. The wage subsidy 
payment is made directly to the employer.
Public Service Employment - Article 16 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that in the 
case of hiring for public works, the wage subsidy may be up to 70 percent provided that no 
payment from another agency or under other provisions is available.
Job Creation Investments - Article 17 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that aid may 
be granted to enterprises for undertaking investment projects intended to facilitate the 
employment of persons displaced from the labor market continuously.
Part-time Employment (Work Sharing) - Article 18 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides 
that in cases where an employer employs all or some of his full-time workers on a part-time 
basis in order to avoid layoffs, and hours are reduced by at least one-third of the full 
working time, up to 50 percent of the personal basic wages lost due to the hours reduction
3The model now in place with monthly payments is similar to that tested in 
Massachusetts, it replaces what was essentially a lump sum grant system in place prior to the 
1991 Act which was similar to the model tested in Washington state. For a discussion of the 
American experiments see Wandner (1992).
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may be provided to employers who pay their workers for the lost hours of work. Such 
payment may be made for up to one year provided the employer does not resort to a layoff, 
in which case the amount of any aid granted shall be repaid by the employer.
Early Retirement Subsidy - Article 19 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that an 
employer may apply for payment from the Employment Fund of some of the money payable 
by him as a consequence of early retirement of his workers.4 The amount may be up to 50 
percent if a considerable layoff was involved and no profit was realized or a loss was made 
during the previous year, or 100 percent if the enterprise goes out of existence or is 
liquidated without a successor in title. A layoff is deemed considerable if at least 25 percent 
of the average staff of the year before or not less than 300 workers are released. Early 
retirement pension cost supplements shall be suspended prior to normal retirement age if 
gainful employment for wages at least equal to the minimum wage is obtained.
3.2 ALPs in Poland
Placement Service - The .Placement Service was established to help unemployed workers and 
enterprises fill job vacancies. The services are provided free of charge to all and are based 
on the following principles: (1) available to all, (2) voluntary services, (3) equality of service 
to job seekers without regard to nationality, political or social orientation, gender, religion or 
other circumstances, (4) openness all vacancies are publicly announced. Under the law, 
establishments are obliged to report to the nearest LLO all job vacancies and opportunities 
for vocational preparation, but there is no penalty if openings are not reported. LLOs have 
the responsibility to register unemployed and job seekers.
To retain eligibility for services of the System of Labor Offices (SOLO), unemployed 
persons are obliged to report to a Local Labor Office (LLO) at least once a month, as well 
as whenever called by the LLO to confirm their job readiness, to take a job, or to receive 
information on opportunities for employment, training, or retraining. The Voivod Labor 
Offices (VLOs) and LLOs shall provide vocational guidance, direction to a job, or direction 
to training. Medical, psychological, and pedagogic examinations should be administered by 
VLOs and LLOs to assess the job readiness of unemployed persons. The costs of these 
examinations may not be imposed on the unemployed persons.
Services provided include: (1) registration of unemployed people and job seekers, (2) 
keeping records of unemployed and job seekers, (3) providing aptitude testing and vocational 
guidance, and (4) soliciting and registering job vacancies.
4The cost of early integration into the national retirement pension system, and an 
employers obligation, is covered under a separate act.
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Retraining - If there are no reemployment opportunities in a local area then LLOs may 
initiate training or retraining. The LLO should organize retraining particularly when: (1) 
there is a lack of any vocational skills among the unemployed, (2) there is a need to change 
their qualifications due to the lack of job offers which would match their qualifications and 
the state of their health in the local area, or (3) individual unemployed persons have lost the 
ability to work in their previous occupation.
A training benefit may be paid to an unemployed person who qualifies for the 
unemployment benefit. In any particular case, retraining should not exceed 6 months, and 
may not exceed 12 months. The training benefit amounts to 115 percent of the 
unemployment benefit. If unemployed persons are not eligible for unemployment 
compensation the training benefit is paid by the LLO. If a person quits training before 
completing a course of study they must reimburse the costs of training. If such a person is 
entitled to the unemployment benefit he/she does not have to reestablish benefit entitlement. 
After quitting training, he/she automatically reacquires this entitlement. If a trainee is 
otherwise eligible to receive unemployment compensation that person is also entitled to: 1) 
family and nursing allowances and death grants, 2) benefits due for job accidents and 
occupational diseases, 3) benefits of the health care system. Also, during, periods out of 
work, social insurance contributions are made. Benefits are also paid for members of the 
family.
Loans to the Unemployed for Small Business Start-up - Local Labor Offices may grant loans 
in lump sums to unemployed workers for self employment. The loan may not exceed 20 
times average pay. If self employment is continued for 24 months, 50 percent of the loan 
amount may be forgiven by the LLO. Loan contracts are made with the LLO at prevailing 
interest rates and under rules administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 
(MOLSP). Lists of persons granted loans are public. The administrative procedures issued 
in the Order of the Minister of Labor and Social Policy dated December 17, 1991 on the 
rules for granting loans from the Labor Fund (Dz. U. No. 122, item 539) require certain 
elements in the business plan of the loan applicant, specify the rate of interest for payment on 
the loan, set the maximum term of the loan, and require immediate repayment if the agreed 
on business plan is not pursued.
Loans to Employers for Job Creation - Local Labor Offices may grant loans to existing 
businesses to organize new places for employment. The amount of the loan may not exceed 
20 times average pay per new work place created. New work places must be organized for 
at least 24 months. Loan contracts are made with the LLO at prevailing interest rates and 
under rules administered by the MOLSP. Lists of persons granted loans are public.
The administrative procedures issued as the Order of the Minister of Labor and Social 
Policy dated December 17, 1991 on the rules for granting loans from the Labor Fund (Dz. 
U. No. 122, item 539) require a loan recipient to have had stable employment levels in 
recent years, to have a specific plan for use of the job creation investment loan including a 
statement of the exact number of new job places to be created, to pay a specific rate of
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interest on the loan, to repay the loan within a certain number of months, and to immediately 
repay the loan if the agreed on job creation investment is not pursued.
Public Works - Upon application of the organizer of a public works project, the pay and the 
social insurance premium for an unemployed person sent by a LLO and employed in a public 
works project are covered from the Labor Fund up to 75 percent of the average pay for each 
person sent and employed. Public works may be operated by municipal (gmina) authorities 
or by local representatives of national government administration. The Ministry of Labor 
and Social Policy has set forth the following general principles for organizing Public Works 
projects: (1) Public Works projects should be infrastructure investments like roads, forestry, 
communication and so forth, (2) Public Works projects should not compete with any existing 
business, (3) Public Works projects should recruit workers through the Local Labor Offices 
(LLOs), (4) proposals for Public Works projects should be sent by LLOs and VLOs to their 
employment councils for review, finally (6) contracts for Public Works projects must state 
the number of persons to be employed, the type of work to be done, the dates of work, the 
funding arrangements, and the LLOs who will refer workers. While not a requirement of 
the Act, it is a practice of the Ministry to give priority for Public Works projects to those 
areas with the highest unemployment rates. Indeed, the amount of funds allocated to projects 
in an area from the Labor Fund increases with the level of unemployment in the area.
Intervention Works - "A Local Labor Office reimburses to the employer part of his expenses 
connected with hiring an unemployed person within an intervention works project up to the 
amount of the unemployment benefit that person is entitled to, including the social insurance 
premium, for a period of six (6) months."5 The maximum length of an intervention works 
project is 6 months. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy has set forth the following 
general principles for organizing Intervention Works projects: (1) Intervention Works 
projects may not compete with any companies, (2) Intervention Works may be undertaken 
only by companies which during the most recent 6 months did not lay off more than 10 
percent of their workers, (3) Intervention Works projects may not be organized by political 
parties, trade unions, government agencies, churches, or foreign states (4) Intervention 
Works projects should recruit workers through the Local Labor Offices (LLOs), and (5) 
contracts for Intervention Works projects must state the number of persons to be employed, 
the type of work to be done, the dates of work, the funding arrangements, and the LLOs 
which will refer workers.
Wage Subsidies for Hiring Recent Graduates - Establishments that hire unemployed recent 
graduates are exempt from paying a tax contribution to the Labor Fund on wages paid to 
their employees for up to 9 months. 6 Furthermore, a LLO may pay to the hiring
5From Article 17 of the Act.
6For recent graduates, the effective maximum duration of unemployment compensation 
entitlement is nine (9) months. A person who registers as unemployed immediately upon
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establishment an amount equal to the unemployment compensation and social insurance 
contribution which the LLO would have disbursed had the person been unemployed. This 
payment can be made for a period for which a graduate could collect the benefit if the 
graduate is to be employed in this firm for longer than 12 months.
4. Performance Measurement Systems for Active Labor Programs
Management information systems are being developed in both Hungary and Poland to 
support decentralized decision making in employment policy and promote superior 
performance through positive incentives. These systems provide more than simply 
computerization of existing functions. The systems will informate rather than simply 
automate activities of all professionals within the employment program organizations from 
employment specialists to top managers. The systems organize information on several 
characteristics of persons seeking work, employers seeking workers, employment services 
available, and active labor program service providers. For managers, the system presents 
information combined from financial and follow-up records to provide information critical to 
decisions about allocation of resources.7
The foundation of the management information system is the monitoring of active 
labor programs effectiveness. The system focuses on timely measures which can be readily 
implemented and will become a natural tool for managers. The process centers on what are 
called performance indicators (PI). These measures will allow establishment of baseline 
performance targets. This section overviews the principles behind the approach of 
performance measurement, describes how the systems for use by management were 
developed, and lists the specific performance indicators selected.
To develop good PI the goals of active labor programs must be clearly understood. 
Depending on employment policy goals within a particular region, certain of the PI will be 
more important than others. The underlying aim of all active labor programs is to get 
program participants employed in regular non-subsidized jobs.
Performance indicators are a widely accepted method for managing public programs. 
Green and Aaronson (1992) discuss how PI are used in managing training and education
graduation, becomes eligible for compensation after three months if all attempts to find 
employment fail. Such a recent graduate then loses entitlement twelve (12) months after 
leaving school.
7In a fully evolved system, the traditional job matching function carried out by a clerk 
with a file cabinet, is improved in the informated environment by allowing the system to pre- 
screen available options and present a list to the employment specialist of the most promising 
alternatives ranked by likely success given the characteristics of the client.
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programs in 39 programs which are administered by 7 departments of the U.S. federal 
government. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) provide documentation of innumerable cases 
where PI are used by state and local governmental units in the U.S. Extensive systems of PI 
are also used in England and Sweden for labor market programs.
Naturally, performance indicators (PI) should be set to guide program operations 
toward the goals of the programs, but the most fundamental principle governing the 
development of performance indicators is that outcomes rather than process is emphasized. 
This is particularly important to bear in mind when instituting such a system within 
government agencies where planning and building of organizations was up until recently the 
main objective.
Particularly during the early phase of implementation it is important that the system for 
monitoring cost effectiveness of active labor programs not impose an excessive administrative 
burden on county and local employment centers where the first priority must be service to 
clients. The list of PI should be relatively short for any particular program, and the 
associated follow-up surveys should ask the minimum possible number of questions. By 
limiting performance measurement to a small number of indicators, the follow-up surveys 
may also remain simple. This will increase the reliability of data gathered, increase the 
response rate, and increase the likelihood that the system will survive over time thereby 
yielding valuable information on how programs perform over time.
A basic objective of evaluating active labor programs is to compare their relative cost 
effectiveness. Indeed many of the PI to be used are cost-effectiveness measures in the sense 
of Garber and Phelps (1992). They are all constructed so as to measure output per unit 
input. The ultimate success of any active labor program occurs when a program participant 
either gains regular employment or avoids unemployment with the assistance provided. The 
average expenditure to achieve this result is the basic measure for comparing effectiveness 
across programs. It is anticipated that results of monitoring the PI will feed directly into the 
planning process and help determine the budget allocation. This is part of the process which 
may result in an optimal mix of programs. Since the regions vary in their industrial mix and 
economic strength and the programs vary in their duration and scale most PI proposed are 
stated in relative terms. The sole exception are PI for earnings. 8
In specifying PI for active labor programs it is important that the intermediate goals 
which result from the PI are consistent with the broad objectives of securing appropriate 
regular employment and maintaining adequate income support. High performance as 
measured by the PI should not have unintended negative side effects. The issue of incentive
Performance indicators of earnings have been deleted from the implementation in 
Hungary based on the judgement that survey response rates would be too low with sensitive 
earnings questions included, and the claim that in Hungary as in other European countries 
wage dispersion within occupations is small.
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compatibility of PI with larger aims has received quite extensive attention in the research 
literature; important papers are: Barnow (1992), Dickinson et al. (1988), and Singer (1986).
4.1 A Hierarchy of Goals for Labor Market Programs
To give a systematic overview of the goals of labor market programs and to guide the 
specification of PI which support these goals, Figure 2 is provided below. The left hand side 
of Figure 2 is presented as a pyramid to reflect the fact that there is a hierarchy in the goals 
for labor market programs. The right hand side of Figure 2 gives a translation of the three 
levels in the pyramid into categories of PI.
The over-riding goal of the collection of labor market programs is to achieve 
reemployment of unemployed persons. This goal is represented at the top of the pyramid in 
Figure 2. Two categories of performance indicator measure the success in achieving this 
goal: r - rate of reemployment, and c - cost of reemployment. The second level in the 
pyramid summarizes the goal of providing transitional services which ease the transition from 
unemployment to reemployment. The category of performance indicator measuring cost of 
achieving this goal is: s - support cost. In the pyramid of Figure 2 the bottom category, or 
foundation of the pyramid, is the variety, of program specific goals, PI for this category are 
labeled p - program specific goals. This is the foundation of the pyramid because it is the 
diversity in the array of programs which supports having a collection. The diversity is 
necessary because it is impossible to serve all needs with a single program.
Another part of the strategy in developing PI is to specify them so that comparisons 
across programs are possible. Certain of the PI across programs should be similar enough to 
allow this. The most comparable measure across programs falls under the category cost of 
reemployment, c. In the PI this is usually based on measurement of employment at follow- 
up. All programs, except Early Retirement, have a measure of the program cost of 
reemployment. Other categories of PI such as the rate of reemployment, r, and the support 
cost, s, also allow for comparison across programs, but the PI formulae for measurement 
across programs are less similar due to the differences in program design.
4.2 Selecting Performance Indicators in Hungary
There were three major parts of the politics of developing performance indicators (PI) 
in Hungary: (1) setting program goals, (2) developing performance indicators of program 
goals, and (3) consensus building. While a separate task in itself, the last of these three 
influenced the approach to developing the other two.
Reaching agreement on the list of performance indicators took much longer than 
planned, however, from the perspective of the long term success of the project the result was 
worth the price. The lengthy process resulted in a significant degree of consensus on the 
criteria, and a sense of participation and ownership by those who will ultimately use the 
system for planning and evaluation.
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While there was some change in the number, type, and rules of the ALPs in Hungary 
between 1990 and 1992, many of the goals for ALPs enunciated by the MOL program 
directors in 1990 were still applicable for the renewed effort.9 In 1992 the principal goals 
stated by representatives of the MOL, the National Labor Center, and the county labor 
administrations in the three project pilot counties were: (1) reemployment in regular (not 
subsidized) jobs, (2) at good wages. While the adequacy of income replacement is frequently 
an issue in the evaluation of passive labor market programs, among ALPs it might be an 
important goal only for public service employment.
On Thursday October 22, 1992 a grand meeting was held in Miskolc, Hungary. The 
meeting was attended by representatives of all groups who will be working with the PI 
system and other advisors. Representatives were from: Ministry of Labor, National Labor 
Center, Labor Research Institute of the Ministry of Labor, Somogy County Labor Center, 
Hajdu-Bihar County Labor Center, Borsod County Labor Center, and the Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. Final agreement was reached on the list of PI to be used, and the 
means for computing the PI. This list of PI is presented in Table 6.
Subsequent discussion of the PI system continued at the October, 1992 conference 
Foglalkoztata's '92-93 in Szeged, Hungary. Where a presentation on the system was given to 
county labor program directors and the Director General of the National Labor Center, the 
Chief of Audit in the MOL, the Chief of Employment Policy in MOL, a representative from 
the Labor Research Institute, and the Deputy Chief of the Training Department in the MOL.
The presentation in Szeged emphasized that work on the system was done in 
cooperation with three different counties and that implementation was still more than a year 
away so that it would be useful if the other county director generals could offer comment to 
help shape the system. The substance of the talk was an overview of the management and 
planning system to be implemented and concrete examples of PI on which the system is 
based. It was stated that the system would be a management tool to aid counties in 
effectively using Employment Fund money. It was emphasized that the system of PI, 
management, and planning did not represent a return to the past days of excessive central 
planning, but rather that it was an approach to maintain decentralized decision making and 
the greatest possible degree of autonomy for county labor administrations. It was argued that 
the PI should be viewed as an unobtrusive means for the MOL and the National Labor 
Center to monitor activity. The system excludes day to day involvement of the National 
Labor Center and MOL in operation of active labor market programs, but allows unobtrusive 
monitoring of performance. The system whereby targets for PI will be set on a county by 
county basis, which recognizes the relative differences in counties in terms of the severity of 
the unemployment problem and the characteristics of the population served by the programs
9The project to revise and implement the PI, planning, and management system began in 
May, 1992 and concluded in December, 1993 with national operation beginning January, 
1994. For a full description of the system see O'Leary (1994).
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was also explained. In terms of using the PI for management, it was claimed that the 
emphasis would be positive reinforcement of good performance and management assistance 
where programs could be improved.
The talk at Szeged concluded with an appeal for resources to support development of 
the computer software for the planning and evaluation system. Shortly after the meeting a 
commitment was made by the National Labor Center to ensure coordination of resources to 
produce a software solution.
In October 1993 training was provided in the PI system to representatives of all 
counties and Budapest at the resort locations of Balaton Foldvar and Malyi. With the 
assistance of computer experts from Borsod county, a working model computer network for 
performance measurement was used during the training seminars. These seminars were 
followed by nationwide implementation of the follow-up surveys and measurement of 
performance via a manual system beginning with programs ended in January 1994.
As seen in the summary matrix of Figure 3, the performance indicators implemented 
allowed monitoring of the full hierarchy of program goals. In March 1995 a national 
conference about the experience with the PI system was held at the National Labor Center in 
Budapest. Wide ranging comments about the system were offered from the counties and 
from federal representatives. It was noted that the impending reduction of ALPs to four: 
retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term unemployed, and self 
employment assistance, will likely simplify the system and speed implementation of the 
computerized system.
4.3 Selecting Performance Indicators in Poland
In Poland the system for performance management of active labor programs is being 
implemented under World Bank project Terms of Reference 2 (TOR 2). Goals for labor 
programs were stated by TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees in March of 1993. 
These goals are listed in Figure 4. A clear statement of program goals is the first step in 
developing a management system which is geared toward achieving outputs rather than 
focusing on process. The program performance indicators presented in this report were 
selected to be incentive compatible with the goals for programs stated here.
The TOR 2 project team worked to translate these goals in to measurable indicators of 
performance. This was done during a fellowship study tour to the United States in May and 
June of 1993. The project team included representatives from the voivod labor offices in 
Krakow, Poznan, and Bydgoszcz and from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. This list was presented to the TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees in July 
1993 for revision and approval. The list adopted is presented in Table 7. That the PI 
selected in Poland span the range of goals for labor market programs is summarized in 
Figure 5.
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5. Data, Methods, and Information Systems for Performance Measurement
The data for computing PI is to be collected and organized at the individual person 
level. In addition to regional characteristics such as the unemployment rate, individual 
records will also include demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education level, 
skill level, and information on any special barriers to employment such as recent school 
leaver, long term unemployed, or degree of physical handicap. Using this data county 
targets for PI can be adjusted to reflect the regional and demographic characteristics of the 
population served. This leveling of the playing field is an important aspect of the PI system 
for comparing performance across counties and programs. It should also be noted that this 
system can be set up to encourage service to the hard to employ by giving extra weight for 
service to target groups with specified barriers to employment.
5.1 Data and Computation of Performance Indicators
To provide solid examples of how administrative (A) and follow-up (F) data is combined 
to compute PI, statement of the computation formulae for each PI listed in Table 6 for 
retraining of unemployed in Hungary is given. Just as in Table 6 the category of 
performance measured by the indicator is indicated by a letter after the name of the 
indicator. All four categories of performance are measured with the six indicators for 
assessing retraining of unemployed. Following the name of each indicator there is a 
statement of the rule for computation and some brief comments about special data gathering 
considerations. There are two categories of data sources for computing the PI: 
administrative records and follow-up surveys. In formulae listed for computation, the source 
of data for each concept is indicated by capital letters in parentheses with (A) for 
administrative records and (F) for follow-up surveys. Each of the PI are to be computed 
using data which covers a single calendar year of program activity. For example, counties 
may be required to report by July 1 on activity completed in the previous calendar year. 
This should allow sufficient time to complete all follow-up surveys which are to be done 3 
months after program completion. This schedule of follow-up is proposed for all 
programs. 10
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c) 
= [total cost for completed courses (A)] / 
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]
10The U.S. Department of Labor Office of Strategic Program and Policy Development 
which oversees monitoring of retraining under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) has 
concluded that three months is the best time for follow-up since it is short enough to allow a 
high response rate among participants, yet long enough to allow sufficient time for 
reemployment. Results based on three month follow-up are highly correlated with 
reemployment rates measured after one year.
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Figures for this PI should be compiled for each course completed during the previous 
year (individual training should be treated as a single course), and averaged over all courses 
completed in the previous year. The denominator is the number of trainees who completed 
retraining in the previous calendar year who are employed on the follow-up survey date.
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r) 
= [number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)] / 
[number of trainees who successfully finished courses (A)]
This PI is computed as a fraction of all persons who completed training. While some 
persons who leave training early may do so to become immediately employed because of a 
job offer which may be related to their retraining, the project team in Hungary chose to have 
at least on PI focus on course completers.
Average cost per training program entrant (s) 
= [total cost for completed courses (A)]/ 
[number of persons entering training courses (A)]
This PI is computed using data from courses completed during the calendar year. The 
data should be compiled around the time of course completion. These figures may be 
compiled for each course, or module, completed during the year (individual training should 
be treated as a single course), and averaged over all courses completed during the calendar 
year.
Proportion of entrants successfully completing retraining (p) 
= [number who finish training courses (A)]/ 
[number who entered training courses (A)]
This PI will be computed for all training completed in each county in the year. 
However, with person level data this could also be computed on a course by course (or 
module) basis for internal county management purposes. It will be compiled two weeks after 
a course ends, after all participants have had at least two chances to pass the final 
examination.
Average monthly earnings of course completers working at follow-up (p)
= [sum of average monthly earnings of course completers at follow-up (F)]/ 
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]
This measure of earnings should be average monthly earnings before bonuses are added 
or taxes are deducted. It should be averaged across only those training course completers 
who are employed at the time of the follow-up survey. 11
"This PI and all PI relating to earnings have been deleted in Hungary. See footnote 8.
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Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at follow-up (p)
= [number of course completers working in occupation of training (F)]/ 
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]
Training may or may not provide explicit occupational skills. This measure should be 
averaged across only those training course completers who received occupational training, 
and are employed at the time of the follow-up survey.
To provide an example, the questions which constitute the follow-up survey for 
participants in retraining programs appears as Appendix A to this report. Similar brief 
surveys have been developed for each of the active labor programs. 12 While an attempt has 
been made to keep the surveys extremely brief so that there will be a high response rate 
when they are distributed by mail, the survey for each program also includes a subjective 
question or two asking for an opinion about the usefulness of the services provided. These 
subjective questions are not directly used in computing PI, but they will provide useful 
information about customer reaction to services. 13
Following returns of mail surveys there will be an attempt to contact those who do 
not respond by mail. In person contacts of non-responders will be attempted by staff of local 
employment centers. Final survey results will be weighted by the reciprocal of the response 
rate in an attempt to correct for non-response bias. 14 Pilot tests of the mail follow-up 
surveys in Hajdu-Bihar county had response rates of about fifty percent. A November 1992 
survey of labor market program participants sponsored by the International Labor Office in 
Borsod, Hajdu, and Somogy counties which was done in person experienced a response rate 
in excess of ninety percent. 15 It is recognized that in person surveys conducted by staff of 
the labor organization may elicit biased responses. In the future it is possible that surveys of 
labor market program participants will be conducted by third party survey organizations.
5.2 Information Systems to Support Program Management
The computerized information systems under development in Hungary and Poland 
each started out to simply support the processing of claims for unemployment benefits and 
the registration of unemployed for job search. The local systems were based on personal
12The follow-up surveys and worksheets use to compute the PI in hungary are given in 
appendices to O'Leary (1994).
13This type of survey question is recommended as very useful for helping to inform 
policy in Chapter 5: "Consumer Driven Government" of Osborne and Gaebler (1992).
14A discussion of the weighting procedure to adjust for survey non-response is given in 
Chapter 14 of Hussmanns, Mehran and Verma (1992).
15For a discussion of this survey see Godfrey, Lazar, and O'Leary (1993).
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computers with some local area networks. Information was transported by car or train on 
diskette to the national office for central processing.
The information system solution to support nation-wide access to management 
summaries was initiated by in house information systems specialists in Hungary, and by 
outside international consultants in Poland. In the final stages of system implementation, 
native computer experts are assembling the solution in Poland as well.
Figures 6 though 10 provide an overview of how the information systems have 
evolved. Figures 6 and 7 summarize the bottom-up approach of Hungary, and Figures 8, 9, 
and 10 summarize the top down approach followed in Poland.
Figure 6 identifies 6 active labor programs in Hungary and their computerized support 
by 7 information system modules. Each information system (IS) module has two categories 
of users: local office and county office. This categorization facilitates the standardization of 
software and rapid implmentation. Figure 7 shows the scheme for combining employer data 
with person level data to establish an information base for monitoring the performance of 
active labor programs.
The Hungarian approach is very practical and simple, however it may produce some 
islands of information and a weak integration of information for advanced informatization. 
The informatization should be the next step after the Hungarian approach, which automates 
most of the clerical functions.
The plan for Poland is more ambitious, it aims to integrate databases and reports of 
almost 600 local, voivod, and national level offices simultaneously. The goal is to automate 
clerical functions and to informate decision-making by the generation of a concept of the 
situation in each active labor program. The solution is based on performance indicators and 
management action rules for various ranges of measured performance. Also, this approach 
recognizes two areas of computerization: primary area: active labor programs (person- 
employer-trainer) and secondary area: back office administration of 600 offices.
It is important to note that since the development of the performance management 
system began, the staffing at Labor Offices in Poland has grown from 9,000 in 1993 to 
13,000 in 1995. If computerization fails, this number may continue to increase. 
Furthermore, management decisions will likely be re-active rather than pro-active.
Figure 8 identifies information systems for administrative support of employment 
offices in Poland, this operates from one principal database with five main sets of control 
programs. Another executive control program integrates program information with back 
office information for decision making at either the local, voivod, or national levels of the 
system of labor offices. The executive control system includes performance measurement 
funcitons.
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Figure 9 shows the architecture of source databases (voivod levels) and repetitive 
categories of control programs which should generate scheduled reports and queries. The 
minimal solution involves 4 databases and 7 control programs, which will be repeated in 
about 560 regional offices. Control programs also will be repeated at regional and national 
offices.
Finally, Figure 10 provides a global view of the physical and logical enterprise-wide 
computing system.
6. Adjustments for Comparison of Performance
For the following three reasons, an adjustment methodology has been proposed as 
part of the system of performance indicators for Hungary and Poland: (1) to assess the 
effectiveness of programs in each county considering the specific reemployment difficulties 
faced in the county, (2) to reduce creaming when counties work to meet performance 
targets16 , and (3) to provide incentives for targeting services to certain special groups.
This section provides a description of how demographic data on clients and indicators 
of conditions in local labor markets may be used to adjust national standards for local 
conditions and to reduce creaming in program assignment. A general methodology for 
adjusting the national performance targets to reflect the conditions in the county labor market 
is being developed in Hungary and under consideration in Poland. The agency responsible 
for program administration may choose to designate certain groups for special attention in 
reemployment services (perhaps persons with eight or less years of schooling, persons not 
covered by unemployment compensation, the physically handicapped, and long term 
unemployed might be targeted for services). If this is done, methods for adjusting the 
performance targets by service to these target groups could be incorporated in the adjustment 
methodology to provide an incentive for providing service to these groups.
6.1 A Simple Example
Figure 11 is an example of a work sheet which may be used by a Hungarian county 
or Polish voivod to adjust the national performance target to determine its own performance
16Creaming refers to the practice of program administrators selecting the most qualified 
candidates for program participation so as to increase the likelihood of program success. 
The analogy is to milk where the best part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed 
off. Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most 
qualified people get assistance then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it 
might be otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of becoming 
reemployed even without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified 
applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.
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targets for a particular performance indicator. The example given in Figure 11 is for the 
Hungarian county Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen for the performance indicator: "cost per training 
program completer employed at follow-up."
In Figure 11 the national average performance indicator (PI) value is simply the 
unadjusted average of the PI values realized across the nation. The numbers listed under the 
heading weights are the amounts by which deviations in county values of PI from national 
average PI values change the county performance targets from the national performance 
targets for each particular factor. The weights in Figure 11 are based on hypothetical data. 
The example given shows a case where it is typical in the nation for a one percent increase 
in the percent of training participants who are aged 45 or over to decrease the average cost 
per employed trainee at follow-up by HUF 18,210 (monetary units Hungarian Forints). 
Increases in the other factors percent of trainees with 8 or fewer years of schooling, percent 
of trainees who are recent graduates, and the unemployment rate in the county all tend to 
increase the average cost per employed trainee at follow-up.
Since the PI concerns average cost, in this example a lowering of the numerical 
performance target is a tightening of the standard, and a raising of the numberical 
performance target means the standard is relaxed. In the example, since Borsod county 
involved 0.36 percentage points more persons over 45 years of age in their training program 
than the national mean, and since that factor tends to decrease costs, the performance target 
for Borsod county is lowered by HUF 6,560. Since Borsod county had a larger share of 
retraining participants with low educational attainment compared to the national average, and 
since increases in that factor tend to increase costs, the Borsod county cost standard will be 
slightly relaxed for this factor. For the fourth factor, since the unemployment rate in Borsod 
county exceeds the national average by a significant margin, and since a high unemployment 
rate tends to raise the average cost per employed trainee at follow-up the performance target 
is significantly relaxed for this factor.
6.2 Development of the Adjustment Weights
The weights used in the performance indicators adjustment method work sheet are 
simply coefficients from estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) of a multivariate 
regression model of the following type:
(1) Yi = b0 + b^ + b2x2i + b3x3i + b4x4i + ui}
where, xt to X4 represent the four adjustment factors used to compute the weights which 
appear in Figure 11. The four factors are: percent of training participants aged 45 years and 
over (xj), the percent of training participants who had 8 or fewer years of formal education 
(xj), the percent of training participants who are recent graduates (x3), and the county 
unemployment rate in percentage terms fo). Following is the result of estimating equation 
(1) on hypothetical data provided by the Borsod County Labor Center for the 20 Hungarian 
counties:
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(2) ys = 152.3 - 18.2xu + O.lx2i + 9.6x3i +
(116.6) (17.3) (2.3) (12.2) (2.8)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, the coefficient of determination was 0.52. The 
F-statistic for joint significance of all parameters estimated of 4.06, indicated that taken 
together the parameters are non-zero in a test at the 95 percent confidence level. It is 
important to emphasize that the results given in equation (2) and also used in the example of 
Figure 11 were estimated using hypothetical data.
6.3 Refinement of the Adjustment Methodology
There are obvious problems with the adjustment methodology as presented. Clearly a 
sample size of 20 is too small on which to base such an important management method. 
Furthermore, before adjusting the performance targets, the OLS regression parameters will 
automatically place half of the counties above the national mean performance targets and the 
other half below.
It is being recommended that an adjustment methodology only be attempted after the 
first year of data collection which includes gathering of follow-up surveys. From these 
surveys large random samples may be taken with the PI being calibrated using micro data. 17 
This procedure will involve linking unit costs to programs. In the future as the system 
matures, the adjustment factors used will change depending on changes in policy targets, and 
the methodology used for computing adjustment weights will be refined. 18
7. Uses of management information
The system of PI described in this paper for active labor programs is quite similar to 
that used for the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs in the United States. 
Laventhol and Horvath (1988), and Ryan and Kauder (1990) are excellent detailed manuals 
for managing with a system of performance indicators. The main principles guiding these 
methods are summarized in Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) Reinventing Government, the 
closely read manual for analysts working on Vice President Al Gore's committee to improve 
the efficiency of the American federal government.
17A good discussion of methods for refining performance indicators is given in Richard 
W. West (1992), Development of Adjustment Models for PY 92 JTPA Performance 
Standards for Titles II-A and III. Menlo Park, CA: Social Policy Research Associates (June).
18A good guide on setting performance indicators was produced by the Office of Strategic 
Planning and Policy Development (1989) in the U.S. Department of Labor. It is called a 
Guide for Setting JTPA Title II-A and Title III (EDWAA) Performance Standards for PY 89. 
The Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Development also funded the report by West 
(1992).
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7.1 Incentives: Rewards and Management Assistance
While the planning and evaluation methods developed for active labor programs will 
also have many unanticipated uses for management, it is expected that the five principal uses 
will be:
(1) To preserve decentralized decision making about allocation of funds to various 
programs and service providers.
(2) To promote superior performance by counties, local offices, and service 
providers through positive incentives.
(3) To help identify and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or 
sanctions.
(4) To contribute information on performance to the funding allocation process.
(5) To ensure compliance with legal requirements of programs. 
The emphasis among these uses is on positive incentives rather than punitive action.
7.2 Summarizing Performance Indicators: Four Examples
Table 8 presents a summary of some results of using PI for three hypothetical 
counties A, B, and C~in Hungary. Table 8 lists the percentage deviation from the 
regression adjusted performance target for each county. Hypothetical values are included for 
all the PI listed Table 6 except for the program Retraining of the Employed. The 
presentation in Table 8 provides a convenient way to examine the various dimensions of 
performance for each separate program. The table also allows comparison across programs 
using PI with similar units of measure. It is possible to use the PI information in a variety 
of ways. Relying on the example from Hungary, in this section we briefly review four 
possibilities.
Following the guide to PI given by Figure 2, a summary indicator for the PI category 
Cost of Reemployment could combine information from six of the separate programs for 
which PI are listed in Table 6 to compare overall program performance across counties in 
Hungary:
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(1) Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
(2) Average sum of assistance per person still self employed at follow-up (c)
(3) Subsidy per worker in regular employment at follow-up (c)
(4) Average PSE cost per worker in regular work at follow-up (c)
(5) Average cost of subsidies per new job created (c)
(6) Average cost per job saved (c)
While each of the six measures is slightly different, all of these performance indicators 
measure the average cost of final program success: reemployment. Averaging the percentage 
deviations from adjusted standards across the six measures yields the following simple 
average cost indicators: -4.0 percent for County-A, 17.5 percent for County-B, and -4.3 
percent for County-C. It is reasonable to average these cost indicators because the objective 
for each cost indicator is to be below the target cost level-a negative deviation. In the 
example, counties A and C were in the acceptable range for cost effectiveness while county 
B significantly exceeded its cost target.
A natural next step would be to investigate the particular programs which contributed 
most to the high average cost for_County B. A problem with this method is that programs 
operated at very high average cost for achieving outcomes could be offset by others which 
are operated very cost effectively. That is, the summary measure obscures important 
program specific performance information.
A natural alternative approach which could directly aid counties making their budget 
allocation decisions would be to compute the weighted average cost of alternative programs, 
where the weights are the ratio of clients served by that particular program to the total 
number of participants in all county employment programs. The result of this computation is 
the weighted mean cost across programs. This summary measure can be used to directly 
guide the counties in the optimal allocation of their county employment budget across 
programs. Reallocating participation to lower cost programs will lower the weighted mean 
cost and increase overall cost effectiveness of programs.
A third approach to transforming the quantitative information in the PI system into 
qualitative information for management purposes is summarized graphically in Figure 12. 
This diagram assumes that the values of PI vary across counties so that there is some 
distribution of PI values. Within the distribution for each PI it will be possible to set up 
ranges of critical values and allow the computerized management information system to 
produce a report suggesting management action based on a county labor center value of a PI. 
The example depicted in Figure 12 suggests that PI values close to the national mean value 
would indicate performance classified as "normal" with the suggested management action to 
provide the average budget increase. PI values in the "success" range would yield X percent 
budget increase, while those in the "excellent" range would yield a Y percent budget 
increase. PI values in the "Conflict" range would result in an X percent budget decrease, 
while a PI value in the "crisis" range would result in management assistance being sent from
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the NLC. This suggestion represents a qualitative approach to budget allocation. 
Description of a somewhat more technical and quantitative approach follows.
Drawing again on information from Hungary, a fourth example of how performance 
information may inform policy decisions is presented in Table 9. The method here is to 
select the cost for achieving reemployment for a particular program and dividing the cost of 
other programs through by that cost to clearly expose policy trade-offs. The reference cost 
selected for the example given in Table 9 is the average cost of reemployment through group 
retraining. 19 Since no adjustment methodology has been performed to account for 
differences in economic conditions, the counties are listed randomly in Table 9 with county 
names suppressed. Table 9, however, is based on actual performance data collected in 
Hungary for the first half of 1994. While the cost of achieving reemployment through group 
retraining differs across counties, Table 9 nonetheless clearly reveals the relative cost to the 
counties of the different programs.
7.3 Allocation of Funds
In both Hungary and Poland the allocation of money from the federal government to 
the provincial and local governments for active labor programs is handled similar ways. 
Some money is reserved by the federal government for special projects such as rapid 
response to mass layoffs or targeted efforts in high unemployment regions. Another fund for 
active labor programs is distributed to the provinces by a formula which depends on a variety 
of factors including things like the number of registered unemployed, the number of long 
term unemployed, and the number of recent school graduates. 20 The provinces (called 
counties in Hungary and voivods in Poland) then decide on allocation across active labor 
programs within the province.
It has been proposed that one or two summary PI measures of the type suggested 
above in Section 7.2 be added to the algorithm for allocation across counties of the 
decentralized Employment Fund in Hungary. It was suggested that the performance factors 
be assigned a weight no greater than 10 percent. It is imperative that this be done to give 
importance to the PI system. If even 10 percent of the budget allocation depends on 
measures of program performance, a great positive incentive for efficiency will be created. 
To give stability to the planning process, it has also been proposed that the budget allocation 
process in each year be based on the previous year's allocation, and that not less than 85 
percent of the previous year's allocation be guaranteed, with the selected algorithm used to 
distribute only the remainder of the fund. A similar recommenation has been made in 
Poland.
19In this example the average cost of reemployment through group retraining is a type of 
numeraire.
20An overview of the Hungarian budget allocation model is given in O'Leary (1993).
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7.4 An Overview of the Evaluation and Planning Process
The following is an outline of the evaluation and planning process proposed for 
Hungary and Poland. In the outline the regional administrative districts are referred to as 
provinces rather than counties or voivods. The management system suggested calls for 
establishment of Master Plans which govern practices by the national and provincial 
employment organs. Once Master Plans are established they remain relatively unchanged 
from year to year. The annual cycle mainly involves Annual Plans and Quarterly Reports. 
The system outlined is under close consideration by the Ministry and the National Labor 
Center in Hungary; it has not yet received careful review in Poland.
(1) The Ministry sets general goals for employment programs.
(2) The Ministry includes their goals in a Master Plan for employment programs.
(3) The Ministry prepares and distributes Guidelines for Preparing a Province Master 
Plan for Employment Programs.
(4) Provinces state goals and procedures in their Province Master Plan for Employment 
Programs.
(5) Ministry and the National Labor Organization estimate the "Number of job seekers 
who actively use the employment exchange" for the planning year for each province. 
These estimates are communicated in the Guidelines for Preparing a Province Master 
Plan for Employment Programs.
(6) The Province Annual Plan for Employment Programs summarizes program activity 
and achievement of national program performance standards and province program 
targets, and describes the management, monitoring, and planning procedures used in 
the province. Provinces also include a financial forecast of the cost associated with 
planned activities.
(7) The planing department in the Ministry reviews the annual plans and prepares a 
Ministry Annual Plan for Employment Programs which is the basis for the 
employment programs budget request from Parliament.
(8) The Ministry reviews the province performance on the previous year's performance 
targets and specifies targets for the coming program year. The Ministry informs the 
province about funding available for employment programs in coming year.
(9) The provinces solicit retraining, PSE, and job creation investment proposals and 
prepare for the process of proposal review and project award.
(10) The provinces submit reports to the Ministry on program activity quarterly.
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8. SUMMARY
This paper describes the context of active labor programs in post-socialist Hungary 
and Poland. It then proceeds to review the rules and aims of the active labor programs. 
Next the comprehensive and integrated management and planning systems, based on a set of 
performance indicators (PI) for these programs, is described. This is followed by 
presentation of the PI to be used for monitoring active labor programs together with a 
discussion of the politics of selecting and implementing the PI system. Also given is an 
explanation of how the PI will be used with administrative and follow-up data and the 
automated information system supporting management decisions.
The systems of PI are designed to monitor performance while allowing decentralized 
decision making and avoiding adverse incentives. The systems are intended to promote 
superior performance through positive incentives, and to help identify and correct poor 
performance through technical assistance and/or sanctions. The paper shows how the PI 
allow a standardized assessment of program performance across administrative districts. An 
example is given which shows how demographic data on clients and indicators of regional 
unemployment are used to adjust national standards for local conditions. Finally, the paper 
explains how information from the performance assessment may be used in the annual 
planning and budget allocation process for active labor programs.
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Appendix A 
Example Retraining Follow-up Survey
Course Code Number: 
Description of course:
Local Office Number:
Name of Respondent: 
Address of Respondent: 
Postal Code:
Follow-up Survey for Retraining of the Unemployed
(Survey to be conducted 3 months after conclusion of the training course)
Please, give written answers in the spaces provided, and underline the appropriate answer 
where alternatives are offered.
A. How would you rate the quality of training organized for you by the Labor Center?
1. excellent 4. poor
2. good 5. very poor
3. fair
B. Could you get regular employment after the training?
1. Yes, I got employed
2. Yes, I got self-employed
3. No, I did not get employed
(If you answered c, please skip forward to question H.) 
C. Are you now employed or self-employed?
1. Yes 2. No 
D. When did you get your first job after the training course ended?
Year __ Month ____ Day ___
(If first job was self-employment go to question F.)
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E. Type of employment:
1. Indefinite term
2. Fixed term (a definite number of months)
F. Please describe your job or self-employment enterprise:
G. On your new job, what is the value of the skills learned in your retraining course?
1. extremely valuable 4. of little value
2. very valuable 5. worthless
3. valuable
H. If you are not currently employed, why are you not employed?
1. I wanted a job, but there were no vacancies
2. I wanted a job, but the wages offered were too low
3. I could not look for a job, because of health problems
4. I have been enrolled in school full-time
5. I have been doing military service
6. Other reason, explain:
I. If you are not employed and not an entrepreneur, what benefits do you receive?
1. Regular unemployment compensation
2. Unemployment compensation for new labor force members
3. Unemployment assistance for regular UC exhaustees
4. Neither 1, 2, nor 3.
J. Other comments or observations: ___________________________
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Labor Market and Economic Conditions in Hungary, 1989-94 
(figures are in millions unless otherwise indicated)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Population 10.398 10.365 10.345 10.324 10.294 10.261
Working Age Population 5.963 5.977 6.015 6.044 6.064 6.076
Armed Forces ______
Civilian Labor Force 5.102 4.962 4.816 4.652 4.497 4.320
Civilian Employment 5.078 4.916 4.589 4.096 3.826 3.752
Agriculture 0.820 0.770 0.660 0.458 0.349 0.328
Mining 0.100 0.085 0.073 0.053 0.042 0.039
Manufacturing 1.408 1.400 1.305 1.054 0.940 0.889
Power-Water 0.130 0.127 0.116 0.108 0.105 0.108
Construction 0.345 0.350 0.310 0.217 0.207 0.201
Trade-Catering - - 0.518 0.597 0.580 0.578
Transport-Communication - - 0.382 0.346 0.336 0.315
Financial Services - - - 0.069* 0.073 0.073
Health-Education 0.691 0.669 0.660 0.548 0.586 0.578
Public Administration 0.362 0.305 0.286 0.311 0.298 0.321
Other Services 1.222 1.210 0.279 0.335 0.310 0.322
Registered Unemployed 0.024 0.046 0.227 0.556 0.671 0.568
Self Employed - - 0.300 0.340 0.350 0.370
Registered Unemp. Rate(%) 0.5 0.9 4.7 12.0 14.9 13.1
Consumer Price Infl. (%) 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8
Wage Inflation (%) 17.9 28.6 30.0 25.1 22.0 24.7
Real Wage Growth (%) 0.8 -0.2 -3.7 1.7 -0.4 5.0
GDP Constant Prices (%A) - -4.0 -10.7 -4.5 -0.9 2.0
Industrial Output (%A) - -8.5 -19.1 -9.8 4.0 9.2
Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.
Table 2 
Regional Unemployment Rates in Hungary, 1989-94
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Trans Danubian 0.4 1.1 3.9 10.0 12.5 11.4
Great Plain 0.5 1.0 5.0 12.1 15.4 13.6
North-East 0.8 1.7 7.2 16.2 19.5 17.1
North-West & Budapest 0.2 0.3 2.2 6.7 8.8 7.6
National Average 0.5 0.9 4.7 12.0 14.9 13.1
Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.
Table 3
Labor Market and Economic Conditions in Poland, 1989-94 
(figures are millions of persons unless otherwise indicated)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Population 37.963 38.119 38.245 38.365 38.459 38.544
Working Age Population 23.157 23.278 23.402 23.539 23.693 23.872
Armed Forces 0.373 0.347 0.335 0.342 0.354 0.357
Civilian Labor Force 17.002 16.871 17.010 17.032 17.067 17.743
Civilian Employment 17.002 16.280 15.326 14.677 14.330 14.833
Agriculture 4.557 4.328 4.116 3.839 3.754 3.920
Mining 0.578 0.565 0.459 0.459 0.422 0.394
Manufacturing 4.173 3.947 3.657 3.282 3.040 2.970
Power-Water 0.182 0.137 0.138 0.142 0.167 0.276
Construction 1.321 1.243 1.065 1.066 0.861 0.839
Trade-Catering 1.515 1.626 1.530 1.682 1.997 2.137
Transport-Communication 1.222 1.056 0.999 0.968 0.866 0.835
Financial Services 0.172 0.181 0.179 0.199 0.226 0.241
Health-Education 1.950 2.002 2.039 1.906 1.881 1.875
Public Administration 0.195 0.193 0.202 0.229 0.262 0.268
Other Services 1.137 1.002 0.942 0.905 0.854 1.078
Registered Unemployed 0.000 0.591 1.684 2.355 2.737 2.910
Self Employed 4.270 4.424 4.600 4.850 4.641 4.534
Registered Unemp. Rate(%) 0.0 3.5 9.9 13.8 16.0 16.4
Consumer Price Infl. (%) 251.1 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 29.5
Wage Inflation (%) 291.8 398.0 70.6 38.8 33.8 34.7
Real Wage Growth (%) 11.6 -27.4 0.2 -2.9 -1.1 1.9
GDP Constant Prices (%A) 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.0
Industrial Output (%A) - -24.2 -11.9 3.9 7.3 11.9
Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.
Table 4 
Regional Unemployment Rates in Poland, 1990-94
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
North-East (Polnocno - Wschodni) 9.5 16.4 18.6 22.0 22.2
Central-East (Srodkowo - Wschodni) 6.1 10.9 11.2 13.2 14.7
South-East (Poludniowo - Wschodni) 5.9 11.1 13.0 14.2 14.9
Capital (Stoleczny) 4.3 8.9 10.5 13.5 13.3
Central (Srodkowy) 7.9 14.9 15.9 18.8 18.0
South (Poludniowy) 4.0 8.3 9.7 10.9 11.5
North (Polnocny) 6.4 14.0 17.1 19.6 20.0
Central-West (Srodkowo - Zachodni) 6.7 12.8 14.9 16.9 17.5
South-West (Poludniowo - Zachodni) 7.3 13.9 15.7 18.3 19.1
National Average 3.5 9.9 13.8 16.0 16.4 
Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.
Table 5
Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland






















Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.
Table 6 
Performance Indicators for Active Labor Programs in Hungary
1. Retraining (Article 14) 
Retraining of Unemployed
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r)
Average cost per training program entrant (s)
Proportion of entrants who successfully complete training courses (p)
Average monthly earnings of course completers employed at follow-up (p)
Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at follow-up (p)
Retraining of Employed
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c) 
Average cost per course completer still employed at firm of training at follow-up (c) 
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r) 
Proportion of course completers still employed at firm of training at follow-up (r) 
Average cost per training program entrant (s) 
Proportion of entrants who complete training courses (p) 
Average monthly earnings of course completers employed at follow-up (p) 
Proportion of course completers working in occupation of training 
at follow-up (p)
2. Self Employment (Article 15)
Average sum of assistance per person still self-employed at follow-up (c)
Proportion of persons still self employed at follow-up (r)
Average subsidy per subsidized self-employed (s)
Average added employment resulting from self employment assistance at follow-up (p)
3. Wage Subsidy for Hiring Long Term Unemployed (Article 16)
Subsidy per worker in regular employment at follow-up (c)
Proportion of subsidized workers who are in regular employment at follow-up (r)
Average monthly cost of wage subsidy per subsidized employee (s)
Average duration of subsidy per subsidized employee (p)
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Table 6 Continued
4. Public Service Employment (Article 17)
Average PSE cost per worker in regular work at program exit (c)
Proportion of PSE workers in regular work at program exit (r)
Average monthly cost per PSE worker (s)
Average monthly earnings of PSE workers in regular work at program exit (p)
Average duration of PSE employment for program leavers (p)
Average duration of PSE employment for program leavers who gain regular employment (p)
5. Job Creation Investments (Article 17)
Average cost of subsidies per new job created (c)
Proportion of placements still employed at follow-up (r)
Among jobs promised the proportion actually created (p)
Among jobs created the proportion filled by persons from target groups (p)
6. Part-time Employment (Work Sharing) (Article 18)
Average cost per job saved (c)
Proportion of jobs at risk which are saved (r)
Average cost per job at risk (s)
Average number of months employees are subsidized (p)
7. Early Retirement Subsidy (Article 19)
Average cost per person entering early retirement (s)
Average monthly early retirement subsidy per person (s)
Employment fund share of early retirement commitments made in the calendar year (p)
Average months until regular retirement (p)
8. Employment Exchange (Article 47-53)
Average number of referrals per job placement (r) 
Average number of days until reemployment (p) 
Average cost per employment exchange visit (p) 
Average cost per employment exchange registrant (p) 
Average number of days until vacancies are filled (p)
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Table 7 
Performance Indicators for Labor Programs in Poland
A. Unemployment Compensation
A. 1 Administrative cost per recipient (p)
A.2 Average compensation for a month unemployed (s)
A.3 Average duration as a proportion of entitled duration (d)
A.4 Average days receiving unemployment compensation (p)
A.5 Average earnings replacement rate (p)
B. Placement Service
B. 1 Referrals per person reemployed (r)
B.2 Average cost of finding reemployment for one person (c)
B.3 Average cost per employment exchange visit (p)
B.4 Average number of days until a vacancy is filled (p)
B.5 Average cost of gaining one new job vacancy listing (p)
C. Retraining
C.I Proportion of course completers employed at follow-up (r)
C.2 Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (r)
C.3 Average cost per training program entrant (s)
C.4 Proportion of entrants completing training course (p)
C.5 Average monthly earnings of course completers working at follow-up (p)
C.6 Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at
follow-up (p) 
C.I Proportion of course completers still employed at firm of training at follow-up (for
retraining of employed) (p) 
C.8 Average cost per course completer still employed at firm of training at follow-up (for
retraining of employed) (p)
D. Small Business (Loans to the Unemployed for Start-up)
D.I Proportion of persons still self-employed at follow-up (r)
D.2 Amount of money granted per person still self-employed at follow-up (c)
D.3 Average amount of money granted per loan (s)
D.4 Proportion of the maximum allowable amount of money given on the average loan (p)
D.5 Loan repayments received as a proportion loans given (p)
D.6 Additional persons hired per person still self-employed at follow-up (p)
Table 7 continued
E. Job Creation (Loans to Employers)
E. 1 Proportion of persons still employed at follow-up (r)
E.2 Loan amount per person employed at follow-up (c)
E.3 Average loan amount per new job place (s)
E.4 Average loan as a fraction of maximum allowable amount (p)
E.5 Loan repayments received as a proportion loans given (p)
E.6 Proportion of promised new job places actually created (p)
F. Public Works
F. 1 Proportion of workers gaining regular employment (r)
F.2 Cost of subsidy per employee gaining regular employment (c)
F.3 Average cost of subsidy per employee (s)
F.4 Proportion of unemployed refusing to take part (p)
F.5 Proportion of maximum allowable amount of money spent on the average public
 works project (p) 
F.6 Fraction renewing eligibility for unemployment benefit (p)
G. Intervention Works
G. 1 Proportion of workers gaining regular employment (r)
G.2 Cost of subsidy per employee gaining regular employment (c)
G.3 Average cost of subsidy per employee (s)
G.4 Proportion of unemployed refusing to take part (p)
G.5 Proportion of maximum allowable money spent on the average intervention works
 project (p) 
G.6 Fraction renewing eligibility for unemployment benefit (p)
H. Graduates Subsidies (Wages for recent graduates)
H. 1 Proportion of participants in regular jobs at follow-up (r)
H.2 Cost per participant in regular job at follow-up (c)
H.3 Average monthly cost of wage subsidy (s)
H.4 Average duration of subsidy as a proportion of maximum allowable duration (p)
H.5 Proportion of all registered unemployed graduates participating in the program (p)
H.6 Average monthly wage subsidy as a proportion of maximum allowable cost (p)
H.7 Average duration of subsidy per subsidized employee (p)
Table 8: Percentage deviation of actual values of county performance indicators 
from the adjusted standards
Performance Indicators Measurement County-A Counry-B County-C
1. Retraining
Avg cost per course comp. (cc) emp at follow-up (c) %
Prop of cc who are employed at follow-up (r) %
Avg cost per training program entrant (s) %
Proportion of entrants who complete training (p) %
Avg mo. earnings cc employed at folow-up (p) %
Prop of emp cc wrk in occ. of trn at follow-up (p) %
2. Self-employment
Avg sum-assist per pers self-emp at follow-up (c) %
Prop, of persons still self-employed at follow-up (r) %
Average subsidy per subsidized self-employed (s) %
Avg added employ from self-emp asst at follow-up (p) %
3. Wage subsidy for hiring long-term unemployed
Subsidy per worker in reg. employ at follow-up (c) %
Prop subsidized wkrs in reg emp at follow-up (r) %
Avg mo cost-wage subsidy per subsidized employee (s) %
Avg duration-subsidy per subsidized employee (p) %
4. Public service employment
Avg pse cost per worker in reg work at prgm exit (c) %
Prop pse workers in reg work at prgm exit (r) %
Avg monthly cost per pse worker (s) %
Avg mo earn of pse wrkrs in reg work-prgm exit (p) %
Avg duration pse employment for program leavers (p) %
Avg dur. pse employment for prgm Ivrs in reg wrk (p) %
5. Job creation investments
Average cost-subsidies per new job created (c) %
Prop of placements still employed at follow-up (r) %
Among jobs promised-prop actually created (p) %
Among job created-prop fill by prsn frm trgt grp (p) %
6. Work sharing
Average cost per job saved (c) %
Proportion of jobs at risk which are saved (r) %
Average cost per job at risk (s) %
Avg number of months employees are subsidized (p) %
7. Early retirement subsidy
Avg cost per pers entering early retirement (s) %
Avg monthly early retire subsidy per person (s) %
Employ fund share-early retire commit in cal yr (p) %
Average months until regular retirement (p) %
8. Employment exchange
Average number of referrals per job placement (r) %
Average number of days until reemployment (p) %
Average cost per employment exchange visit (p) %
Average cost per employment exchange registrant (p) %

















































































































Relative Cost of Reemployment for Various
Active Labor Programs by County in Hungary




































































































































































































The columns report program average costs relative to average group retraining costs for: 
group retraining, individual retraining, self employment, wage subsidies, public service 
employment (PSE) average monthly stipend, job creation investments, work sharing, and 
early retirement.
Data from follow-up surveys in all counties for programs completed in the first half of 1994.
Costs listed are for reemployment except for PSE and early retirement. For these programs 
the costs listed are the average stipend per month of PSE work, and average total costs for 
an early retirement.
For anonymity counties are listed randomly.
Figure 1
Registered Unemployment Rate
Hungary and Poland, 1989-94























Hierarchy of Goals for Active Labor Programs 
Guided by Performance Indicators
c - Cost of Reemployment 
r - Rate of Reemployment






A Variety of Other 
Program Specific Goals
p - Program Specific Goals
Figure 3
Classification of Performance Indicators 
for Active Labor Programs in Hungary
Program Name
1. Retraining 
2. Self Employment 
3. Subsidy for Long Term Unemployed 
4. Public Service Employment 
5. Job Creation Investments 
6. Part-time Employment 



































c - Cost of Reemployment 
r - Rate of Reemployment 
s - Support Cost 
p - Program Specific Goals
Figure 4
Goals for Labor Programs in Poland 
Stated by the TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees
Unemployment Compensation/Unemployment Insurance: 
temporary benefits for jobless persons, 
motivating beneficiaries for reemployment.
Placement Service:
finding appropriate reemployment for job seekers, 
motivating registrants to search for jobs, 
maintaining a steady supply of job vacancy listings.
Retraining:
providing professional skills to persons having no profession,
over the long-term, to adjust the skill structure of labor resources to the
changing needs of the economy.
getting trainees reemployed.
Loans to the Unemployed for Small Business Start-up: 
promoting development of small business,
enabling the unemployed to gain reemployment through self employment, 
creation of new jobs, 
relieving the Labor Fund from payment of unemployment compensation.
Loans Employers for Job Creation:
promoting reemployment through creation of new jobs,
supporting the expansion of local businesses,
fostering privileged economic sectors (branches),
relieving the Labor Fund from payment of unemployment compensation.
Public and Intervention Works:
reducing long-term unemployment,
developing local infrastructure to support creation of new jobs,
providing workers with new skills,
promoting reemployment by ensuring readiness to start work.
creating the opportunity for permanent employment,
supporting the development of local businesses,
fostering privileged economic sectors (branches),
Wage Subsidies for Hiring Recent Graduates:
facilitating employment of recent graduates,
supporting the acquisition of practical job skills by graduates thereby
increasing their chances of finding permanent employment.
Figure 5
Classification of Performance Indicators 
for Active Labor Programs in Poland
Program Name
A. Unemployment Compensation 
B. Placement Service 
C. Retraining 
D. Self-employment 
E. Job Creation Investments 
F. Public Works 
G. Intervention Works 



































c - Cost of Reemployment 
r - Rate of Reemployment 
s - Support Cost 
p - Program Specific Goals
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( L ) Local Office Function 
R j Regional Function
Figure 6
Service Hlocks of the IT System of (he Kmploymcnt Rind 
(Su<^cstion on Dividing Inunctions)
Source: Labor Market Information and Analysis Department, 
Hungarian National Labor Center.


















Source: Labor Market Information and Analysis Department, 






























































Figure 8: The Architecture of Administration Oriented MISs 
(Q - query, R - reports)





















































Figure 9: The Architecture of Program-oriented MISs
Source: O'Leary and Targowski (1994), Figure III-4.
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Source: O'Leary and Targowski (1994), Figure V-4.
Figure 11 





1. % AGE 45+ (RT14)
2. % SCHOOL < 8 (RT15)
3. % NEW GRADS (RT16)
4. % UNEMP RATE (III)
D. DATE CALCULATED
6/15/93





























M. NATIONAL AVERAGE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR
N. MODEL-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (L + M)
0. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE LEVEL
P. % DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM MODEL ADJUSTED 
PERFORMANCE LEVEL ((0-N)/N)*100)















Management Response to Performance Indicator Values
HPI - - Normal
Y% Budget 
Increase
X% Budget 
Increase
Average Budget 
Increase
X% Budget 
Decrease
NLO Management 
Assistance
PI
